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CIPOLLONE V. LIGGETT GROUP, INC.:
A PREEMPTIVE LUCKY STRIKE?
INTRODUCTION
The Constitution grants Congress the broad power to preempt valid state
concerns in the furtherance of vital national interests. ' Indeed, the American
legislative process was designed to balance the needs of the many against the
desires of the few. Yet, where Congress fails to clearly articulate its preemptive
wishes, either in a statute's text or in the legislative history surrounding the statute,
reviewing courts must often attempt to interpret the intended preemptive scope of
federal legislation vis-'a-vis traditional state powers. Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc. is representative of the often painful struggle judges and justices experience in
defining the boundaries of congressional intent. 2
Fundamentally, Cipollone is a products liability action. It represents the
attempt of one woman to hold the tobacco industry responsible for the lethal
injuries she allegedly suffered as the result of smoking their cigarettes.3 Rose
Cipollone's story is one of misplaced trust, mistaken judgment and personal
tragedy. Cipollone is, therefore, a very human story.
However, Cipollone also placed before the Court the troublesome question of
tobacco industry liability. In the United States alone, smoking is directly or
indirectly responsible for an estimated 350,000 deaths annually. 4 Additionally,
smoking imposes an estimated $52 Billion 'drag' on the nation's economy in the
form of health care costs and lost worker productivity. 5 Still, many Wall Street
analysts fear that industry-wide liability would cripple the industry, throwing
thousands from their jobs and eliminating millions of dollars in tax revenue.6
Without question, the Cipollone decision has potentially broad social and
economic implications with respect to the future of tobacco industry liability. Yet,
Cipollone may ultimately be remembered more for its discussion of federal
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. "[Tlhe Laws of the United States ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding."
2 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112'S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
4 See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment ofthe Comm on Energy and Commerce,
H.R. 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 99-167, at 104 (1986).
5 Frank J. Vandall, Reallocating the Costs of Smoking: The Application of Absolute Liability to Cigarette
Manufacturers, 52 Omo ST. L.J. 405, 405-06 (1991).
6 Id. at 412. Wall Street analysts speculate that cigarette prices could jump by $3.00 a pack if tobacco
companies are held liable.
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preemption law than for instituting a "third wave" of cigarette litigation. 7 In fact,
the Cipollones themselves provided surprisingly early confirmation of the
decision's short coattails when they abandoned their decade-old lawsuit on
November 5, 1992.8
As such, the gravamen of this casenote will focus on the Court's preemption
analysis. Included in this examination will be the legislative and economic forces
underlying the Court's conclusion that the 1965 Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act does not preempt all state common law tort actions against
cigarette manufacturers. 9
BACKGROUND
The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
In 1965, amidst mounting political and scientific pressure, Congress passed
the "comprehensive" Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act. '0 (Labeling
Act). The Labeling Act was designed to both adequately inform the public of the
health risks associated with smoking AND to protect the national economy
through eliminating divergent labeling and advertising regulations among the
several states."t.
7 The 1950's and 60's saw the "first wave" of cigarette cases, none of which was successful. The "second
wave" would not follow until 1984 and would run roughly through 1988. Cipollone was among the first of
these "second wave" cases and the first to reach the Supreme Court. See Paul G. Crist & John M.
Majoras, The "New" Wave in Smoking and Health Litigation--Is Anything Really So New?, 54 TENN. L. REV.
551 (1987); and Marcia L. Stein, Cigarette Products Liability Law in Transition, 54 TENN. L. REV. 631
(1987).
8 Marc Edell, the Cipollones' attorney, cited the more than $5 million his law firm expended during the
ten years of litigation as the principal reason for the decision to "pull the plug". See Blair S. Walker,
Landmark Smoking Suit Dismissed, USA TODAY, Nov. 6, 1992 (Friday through Sunday Final Edition), at
1A.
9 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. CL 2608 (1992).
10 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1965). (Congress was spurred
into action as a result of several contemporaneous events. The first was a 1964 report issued from the
Surgeon General's Advisory Committee on Smoking and Health. Picking up on the report's
recommendations, the FTC attempted to promulgate its own advertising requirements for the tobacco
industry, which were to take effect July 1, 1966. See Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling 29
Fed. Reg. 8325 (1964) codified as 16 C.P.R. §§ l.bl-1.b7 Congress ultimately suspended the FTC's efforts
in favor of the Labeling Act. Additionally, several states were also contemplating the regulation of
cigarette advertisements within their boarders. See, e.g., N.Y. Health Law § 470 (1965).
t 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988). In full, section 1331 states the Congressional declaration of policy and
purpose as follows:
It is the policy of the Congress, and the purpose of this act, to establish a comprehensive Federal
program to deal with cigarette labeling and advertising with respect to any relationship between smoking
and health, whereby--
(1) the public may be adequately informed about any adverse health effects of cigarette smoking by
inclusion of warning notices on each package of cigarettes and in each advertisement of cigarettes; and
(2) commerce and the national economy may be (A) protected to the maximum extent consistent
with this declared policy and (B) not impeded by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling
and advertising regulations with respect to any relationship between smoking and health.
[Vol. 26:2
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Unlike the preemptive provisions in other acts' 2, Congress did not expressly
address the fate of state common law actions within the preemption clauses of
either the original 1965 Labeling Act or its 1969 amendment. 13 Sections 5(a) and
(b) of the Labeling Act's original preemption provision prevented any state or local
legislative body from imposing any additional "statement" relating to smoking and
health.'4 Congress amended and augmented the scope of section 5(b) in 1969.
Substantively, the proscription on the several states from requiring any further
"statement" relating to smoking and health was replaced with a ban on any
subsequent "requirement or prohibition".15
The congressional alteration of the Labeling Act's preemptive provision is
troublesome, however, in that Congress again failed to address the status of state
common law tort actions under the federal preemptive scheme. 16  The
congressional omission produced a heated debate over the extent of congressional
intent. Proponents of imposing tobacco industry liability argued that the
congressional silence, coupled with the absence of any federal remedy within the
Labeling Act, expressed a determination that state tort claims were permissible.
Moreover, given the historical presumption against state law preemption,
proponents argued that preemption of state law damage claims left those injured
without a legal remedy. 17
The tobacco industry, on the other hand, was forced to develop its argument
around the fact that no court had ever held the text of the Labeling Act to expressly
12 See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, § 505(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e)(1988).
(Provides "savings clause" for injured person to seek common law relief); Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), § 514(a), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)(1988) (ERISA "shall supersede
any and all State laws"); Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986, § 7, 100 Stat.
34, 15 U.S.C. § 4406(c) (1988) (expressly permitting some common law damage actions while preempting
other forms of state regulation).
L3 See Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No 89-92, 5, 79 Stat. 282, as amended by
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 2, 84 Stat. 87.
14 Federal Cigarette Labeling & Advertising Act Pub. L. 89-92, § 5, 79 Stat. 283 (Codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. s 1334). In full, the Preemption Clause of the 1965 Labeling Act states:
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement required by section 4 (15
U.S.C. s 1333) of this titie, shall be required on any cigarette package.
(b) No statement relating to smoking and health shall be reqired in the advertising of any cigarettes
the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of the Act.
15 Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 Pub. L. 91-222, § 2, 84 Stat. 88 (codified as 15 U.S.C. §
1334(b)(1969)). In full, section 5(b) was amended to read:
(b) No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law
with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in
conformity with the provisions of this act.
16 See Cigarette Labeling and Advertising: Hearings before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, H.R. 643, 1237, 3055 and 6543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 176 (1969); Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising: Hearings before the Committee on Commerce, S. R. 559 and 547, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 246
(1965) and Cigarette Labeling and Advertising: Hearings before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, H.R. 2248, 3014, 4007, 7051 and 4244, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 176 (1965). The legislative
history surrounding the 1969 Amendment, as well as the original preemption clause, is sprinkled with
references to the fate of common law actions, but no court has been willing to infer express Congressional
intent from the off-the-cuff comments of a few Congressmen.
17 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct 2608 (1992) (No. 90-1038).
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preempt state common law actions. 18 The industry's position, therefore, relied
heavily on Hines v. Davidowitz 19 as authority for the proposition that state
common law tort actions and damages are capable of creating an "obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."
As such, the industry argues that state common law tort actions violate the
"requirement" prohibition under the Labeling Act's preemptive scheme.
Express and Implied Preemption:"
Prior to the Court's decision in Cipollone, there was little disagreement over
federal preemption law. 20 Rudimentary to any preemptive review is recognizing
that the analysis originates under the assumption against superseding traditional
state police powers. 21 Such state power will prevail unless the "clear and manifest
purpose of Congress" to do otherwise is ascertained. 2 As such, congressional
intent is said to be the "ultimate touchstone" of preemption analysis. 2
It is well established that Congress may expressly preempt state law under
the sixth amendment's supremacy clause.2 Congress need only express its
preemptive wishes in the body of a statute to eliminate concurrent jurisdiction. In
addition to expressed preemption, however, there exist two equally well-
established 5 forms of implied preemtion: occupation of the field26 and actual
conflict-. Determination of implied preemption turns solely on congressional
intent and purpose28, which in turn is discovered from the language, structure and
purpose of a given statute. 9
18 See, e.g., Pennington v. Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1989); Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988); Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987); Stephen v.
American Brands, Inc., 825 F.2d 312 (11th Cir. 1987); and Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181
(3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987).
19 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
30 In light of the depth of the division between the members of the Court, that all nine justices were able
to agree upon preemptive standards of review is perhaps the best illustration of the agreement in this area
of law. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. CL 2608 (1992).
2 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).22 id
23 Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978) (quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhom, 375
U.S. 96, 103 (1963).
'4 Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
25 See, e.g., Ingersoll-Rand Co., v. McClendon, Il1 S.Ct. 478 (1990); Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller,
486 U.S. 174 (1988); Int'l Paper Co., v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
464 U.S. 238 (1984); Pacific Gass & Elec. Co. v. Energy Resources Conservation and Development
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-3 (1963); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,
230 (1947).35 Id
--7 Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Energy Resources Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983). The latter two forms of
implied preemption, Occupation of the Field and Actual Conflict, are judicially determined supplements
to an expressed statutory preemptive clause.
M Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985).
29 FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 56 (1990).
[VoL 26:2
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To ascertain whether a federal law is so comprehensive that it "occupies the
field" in which a coexistent state law operates, a court must engage in a three
question analysis. First, how pervasive is the federal regulatory scheme? Second,
are the federal interests dominant to those of the state? Third, a court must
examine the objective(s) and obligation(s) imposed under the federal act and ask
whether they convey the same purpose(s) as those expressed in the chafing state
law.30 If the federal act leaves no room for parallel state regulation, then Congress
exclusively "occupies the field" and preempts all state law in that area. Thus, a
state regulation operating in a field Congress exclusively occupies will be
preempted even if it is consistent with the federal scheme. 31
If Congress has not entirely occupied a given field, federal law will still
displace state law if there is an "actual conflict" between the state and federal laws.
Similar to the analysis performed above, actual conflict inquiry is predicated on the
purpose of the federal act and the disruptive force of the state statutory scheme. I
Interference from the state law must be such that it becomes virtually impossible to
conform to both the state and federal regulation. 3 However, actual conflict
preemption is not dogmatically applied in all instances. Congress can choose to
"tolerate" concurrent regulation if the state law's hinderance does not amount to an
"obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress." 31
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Facts
Rose Cipollone began smoking Liggett's Chesterfield brand cigarettes at the
age of sixteen.35 She smoked continuously from 1942 through the early 1980's
and would typically consume one to two packs of cigarettes a day.3 6 In her
deposition, Mrs. Cipollone testified that she started smoking to imitate the
30 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F.Supp. 1146, 1163-4 (D.N.J. 1984), rev'd 789 Fdd 181 (3rd Cir.
1986).
31 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985). (A Massachusetts law was said
to be preempted even though it was consistent with the substantive requirements of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)).
32 Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d 50, 63 (3d Cir. 1980).
33 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
3 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). See also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238,
256 (1984)
"No doubt there is tension between the conclusion that safety regulation is the exclusive concern of
the federal law and the conclusion that a state may nevertheless award damages based on its own
law of liability. But... Congress intended to stand by both concepts and to tolerate whatever tension
there was between them. We can do no less."
35 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 548 (3rd Cir. 1990); See also, Brief for Petitioner at 8,
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. CL 2608 (1992) (No. 90-1038).
36 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 551 (3d Cir. 1990). (At the urging of Mr. Cipollone, Mrs.
Cipollone did briefly reduce her consumption while pregnant; however, she did not completely stop
smoking while she was pregnan.)
Fall 19921
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glamorous women in Chesterfield's magazine advertisements. 37  She also claimed
Chesterfield's radio commercials influenced her decision to begin smoking. 38
In 1955, Mrs. Cipollone switched from Chesterfield to another Liggett brand,
L & M Filters.Y L & M's ads claimed a new "miracle tip" would provide
smokers with a 'Light and Mild smoke'.40 Once again, Mrs. Cipollone testified
that the advertising used to promote the L & M Filter was a significant factor in her
decision to change brand allegiances. 41 Mrs. Cipollone would go on to switch
brands again in 1968, 1970 and 1974 citing health and advertising reasons for
each.42
37 See Brief for Petitioner at 8, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct 2608 (1992) (No. 90-1038).
(Mrs. Cipollone died of lung cancer in 1984, thus the only available testimony from her was the deposition
she sat for at Respondent's request).
38 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 548 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1386 (1991),
and rev'd in part, 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992). Respondents stipulated that Mrs. Cipollone had viewed or read
numerous forms of Chesterfield's print, radio and television promotions during the thirteen years (1942-55)
she smoked Chesterfield brand cigarettes. During that period, Chesterfield advertisements contained
messages such as:
"PLAY SAFE Smoke Chesterfield.
NOSE, THROAT, and Accessory Organs not Adversely Affected by Smoking Chesterfields.
First such report ever published about any cigarette. A responsible consulting organization
has reported the results of a continuing study by a competent medical specialist and his staff
on the effects of smoking Chesterfield cigarettes. A group of people from various walks of life
was organized to smoke only Chesterfields. For six months this group of men and women
smoked their normal amount of Chesterfields--10 to 40 a day. 45% of the group have smoked
Chesterfields continually from one to thirty years for an average of 10 years each. At the
beginning and at the end of the six-months period each smoker was given a thorough
examination, including X-ray pictures, by the medical specialist and his assistants. The
examination covered the sinuses as well as the nose, ears and throat. The medical specialist,
after a thorough examination of every member of the group, stated: "It is my opinion that the
ears, nose, throat and accessory organs of all participating subjects examined by me were not
adversely affected in the six-month period by smoking the cigarettes provided." Id.
Chesterfield television ads were also introduced, featuring Arthur Godfrey (Chesterfield sponsored
Godfrey's program). lt at 549.
"... If you believe in me, and over the 23 years I've been in the radio, you know that I have
never yet misled you with advertising. Nobody has been able to buy me enough to do that. If
you believe in me, then you take my word that I know this--that the Liggett and Myers people
don't make statements that they can't substantiate. And when they say that after this test that
they made with the doctor, that after he made it, he comes up and says, quote--'It is my
opinion that the ears, nose, throat and accessory organs of all participating subjects examined
by me were not adversely affected in the six-month period by smoking the cigarettes
provided.' And they mean what they say--that specialist said it. Liggett and Myers have
substantiated it. Remember that when you're wondering about cigarettes. Smoke
Chesterfields--they're good." Id at 550 n.5.
3 Id. at 550.
'o Id. at 551.
41 Id. at 550. Mrs. Cipollone stated in her deposition, "[W]el, they were talking about the filter tip, that it
was milder and a miracle it would keep the stuff inside a trap, whatever . . . it was the new thing and I
figured, well, go along .... [T]hrough advertising, I was led to assume that they were safe and they
wouldn't harm me .... There was lots of advertising. There was advertising everywhere. There was
advertising in magazines, on billboards, in newspapers."
'V Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 551 (3d Cir. 1990). In 1968, Mrs. Cipollone began
smoking Philip Morris' Virginia Slims brand "because it was very glamorous and very attractive ads". She
switch in 1970 to Parliament brand, which was also manufactured by Philip Morris, because it was
advertised as having as having a "recessed" filter. Finally, in 1974, Mrs. Cipollone chose True brand over
[Vol. 26:2
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As Mrs. Cipollone grew older, her health steadily declined. First, Mrs.
Cipollone developed a severe cough. 43 Then, in 1981, Mrs. Cipollone was
diagnosed with lung cancer, which necessitated the removal of her lung in 1982.41
Despite the loss of a lung and continued ill health, Mrs. Cipollone continued
smoking until her physical deterioration finally precluded her from continuing. 5
Rose Cipollone died on October 21, 1984.6
Procedural History
Cipollone's procedural history is fodder for mischievous Civil Procedure
Professors everywhere. Fourteen months before her death, on August 1, 1983,
Mrs. Cipollone and her husband, Antonio, brought this products liability action
against cigarette manufacturers Liggett Group, Inc., Philip Morris Incorporated,
and Loew's Theatres, Inc. in the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey. 47 Following Mrs. Cipollone's death, Mr. Cipollone, suing in his
capacity as Mrs. Cipollone's executor and on his own behalf, filed a third amended
complaint upon which the case proceeded to trial./
Founded on diversity jurisdiction, the Cipollones' fourteen count complaint
sought damages under theories of strict liability, negligence, intentional tort and
breach of warranty.4 In their answer, the tobacco companies raised the
preemption clause of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act as an
affirmative defense to all of the Cipollones' causes of action. 50 The Cipollones
Parliament because of its "low tar" ads and the advice of her doctor. True brand was manufactured by
Lorillard, Inc.43 id
4411
45 id
46id,
47 Id
4 Id. The third amended complaint contained fourteen counts, which differed from the original fourteen.
The in turn, were divided into six different categories, as the circuit court explained:
1. FAILURE TO WARN CLAIM: Strict liability in tort (and negligence) on the theory that the
defendants failed to warn adequately (or negligently failed to warn adequately) of the health effects of
smoking.
2. DESIGN DEFECT CLAIM: Strict liability in tort based on a theory that the Respondents
marketed defectively designed cigarettes rather than alternatively designed, safer cigarettes that were
available.
3. GENERIC RISK-UTILITY CLAIM: Strict liability in tort on the theory that the risks of
smoking cigarettes to the public's health exceed their social utility.
4. EXPRESS WARRANTY CLAIM: Breach of express warranty regarding the health effects of
cigarette smoking.
5. FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION CLAIM: Fraud and misrepresentation in the
Respondents' advertising and promotion of cigarettes from 1940 to 1983.
6. CONSPIRACY TO DEFRAUD CLAIM: Respondents conspired to defraud the public regarding
the health effects of smoking.
49 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F.Supp 1146, 1149 (D.N.J. 1984) rev'd, 789 F.2d 181 (3rd Cir.
1986). (Mr. Cipollone's claim was for loss of comfort, companionship and consortium).
53 ld; See also Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982).
Fall 1992]
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moved to strike the defense, while Loew's motioned for a judgment on the
pleadings. 51
The district court found no express or implied preemption of the Cipollones'
state common law tort actions in the Labeling Act. 2 Thus, the court granted the
Cipollones' motion to strike the Labeling Act defense and denied Loew's motion
for a judgment on the pleadings. 53 From the district court's ruling, the tobacco
companies were granted an interlocutory appeal from the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals. 1
The third circuit agreed with the district court in finding that the Labeling Act
did not expressly preempt the Cipollones' state common law claims. However, the
third circuit went on to discuss the effect of the common law actions vis-'a-vis
implied preemption. The third circuit found the regulatory effect of common law
tort actions might well frustrate the congressional purpose of the Labeling Act. 
55
Without expressly reaching which claims their ruling might affect, the third circuit
held that the Labeling Act preempted all state law damage claims challenging the
adequacy, propriety or duty to provide additional warnings related to smoking and
health beyond those Congress had mandated for cigarette packages. -6 The
Cipollones' previously successful motion to strike the tobacco companies'
preemption defense was therefore reversed, and the case was remanded for
proceedings consistent with the opinion.57
Returning to district court, the parties moved for clarification of the third
circuit's opinion. 8 The district court held the Cipollones' post-1965 claims for
5 Cipollone, 593 F. Supp at 1149.
I ld. at 1171. In short, the district court said, "It would be inappropriate to conclude that what is not
prohibited is permitted or that a minimum standard fixes the maximum . . . In almost every instance,
government standards are meant to fix a level of performance below which one should not fall. However,
legal minimums were never intended to supplant moral maximums." Id. at 1170.
4 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 , 183 (3d Cir.1986). cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987).
The Third Circuit granted Respondents' request and took jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
(1982). Id. (Later, however, Chief Judge Gibbons would lament, "With the benefit of hindsight it seems
clear to me that permission to appeal was improvidently granted. The case was legally and factually
complicated, and our interlocutory ruling was made in the absence of a factual record which would have
sharpened the issues and permitted a more informed application of the Labeling Act ... More
fundamentally, I believe that our interlocutory ruling on the preemptive effect of the Labeling Act, to the
extent that we reached a definitive ruling, was wrong as a matter of law, and should be overruled by the
court en banc." See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 583 (3d Cir. 1990). (Gibbons, C.J.,
concurring), cert. granted, 111 S. CL 1386 (1991) and rev'd in part 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
56 Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 487. The third circuit said, "[W]e accept the appellants' assertion that the duties
imposed through state common law damage actions have the effect of requirements that are capable of
creating 'an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."' quoting from Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).5 5 id
57 Id. at 188.
58 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 664, 666-7 (D.N.J. 1986), rev'd in part, 789 F.2d 181 (3d
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 976 (1987).
[Vol 26:2
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 26 [1993], Iss. 2, Art. 8
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol26/iss2/8
OPOLLONE V. LIGGM GROUP, INC
failure to warn, fraudulent misrepresentation, express warranty and conspiracy to
defraud were barred to the extent that they challenged the tobacco companies'
advertising, promotional and public relations activities after January 1, 1966. 59 The
district court then granted Philip Morris and Lorillard judgment on the pleadings
on their failure to warn and express warranty claims due to the fact that Mrs.
Cipollone had used their products subsequent to the Labeling Act's January 1,
1966 enactment.m However, the district court held the design defect and risk-
utility claims had not been preempted. 6'
After five years of discovery, a four-month trial followed on the Cipollones'
remaining claims, including: failure to warn, design defect, express warranty,
fraudulent misrepresentation and conspiracy.6' At the close of the Cipollones'
case, the district court struck the design defect claim after finding the Cipollones
had failed to sufficiently establish proximate cause against any of the defendant
tobacco companies. 63
The jury deliberated four and one-half days before returning its verdict in the
form of special interrogatories.61 The jury rejected the Cipollones'
misrepresentation and conspiracy to defraud claims against Liggett Group, Inc,
Philip Morris and Loew's.6 And, while the Cipollones prevailed on their pre-1966
failure to warn claim, the jury refused to award damages to Mrs. Cipollone's estate
due to New Jersey's comparative negligence statute; the jury found Mrs. Cipollone
80 percent responsible for her injuries. 6 Mr. Cipollone, on the other hand, was
awarded $400,000 in compensatory damages for Liggett's breach of warranty. 67
Both sides filed post-trial motions, which were denied, and both sides filed a
timely appeal. I
5P Id. at 675. District Judge Sarokin was none too pleased with the task of discerning which of the
Cipollones' causes of action were barred, "The Third Circuit's opinion has thus left this court with the
unenviable task of discerning what that court meant by its mandate and what, if anything, remains of
plaintiffs claims as a result ... Despite this court's vehement disagreement with that conclusion, it is duty
bound to follow the dictates of the superior court." Id. at 667.
6) Id at 669-72.
61 Id. However, in another pre-trial ruling, the Cipollones' generic risk-utility claim was barred
retroactively under the New Jersey Products Liability Act, 1987 N.J.Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 197, 188-93
(West) (codified at N.J.S.A. 2A:58C-1 to -7 (West 1987). See Cipollone v. Ligget Group Inc. No. cv83-
2864 1987 U.S. Dist. Lens 9936 at * 1-6 (D. N.J. Oct 27, 1987).
62 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 553 (3d Cir. 1990), cert granted. 111 S. Ct. 1386 (1991)
and rev'd in part 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
63 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 1487, 1493-95 (D.N.J. 1988). This ruling was not
challenged in the subsequent appeal to either the Third Circuit or the Supreme Court.
(4 FD.R.Civ. PRo. 49(a).
f6 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 664 (D.N.J. 1986). See also Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 553-5 (3d Cir. 1990) (reprinting of the special interrogatories with the jury's responses).
f6 d at 555.
67 Id at 555. Mr. Cipollone's $400,000 compensatory damage award represented the first such monetary
award ever granted to a plaintiff in a smoking related lawsuit. However, the tobbacco industries' "first
loss" was short lived, as as the third circuit over turned this award on appeal. To date, the tobacco
industry has yet to pay a single penny in any smoking related claim.
66 Id
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The third circuit, upon considering the merits of the cross appeal, affirmed in
part, reversed in part and remanded the case for a new trial. 0 From this opinion,
Mr. Cipollone sought a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court, which was
granted to settle the preemption question. 0 Shortly thereafter, Mr. Cipollone died
and the couple's son maintained the action as the executor of his mother's and
father's estates. 7'
ANALYSIS
High Court Lifts Bar to Tobacco Liability SuitsP
A deeply fragmented Supreme Court held 7-2 that the Labeling Act, as
originally drafted and amended, did not preempt all state common law damage
actions. In particular, the Court found post-1969 claims of fraudulent
misrepresentation, conspiracy, express warranty and failure to warn claims (not
based on advertisements) were valid, as were all claims brought as a result of
injuries suffered between 1966-1969. However, the Court found straight post-
1969 failure to warn claims were preempted. 73
Harvard Law School Professor Laurence H. Tribe, who argued on the
Cipollones' behalf, said of the opinion, "This is a major victory for all those who
want to hold cigarette companies accountable." Concurrently, a Philip Morris
spokesperson asserted that "Philip Morris considers today's Supreme Court
decision as a significant victory." 74 Ironically, both are correct.
ld at 583.
1. Affirmed the district court's order dismissing the Cipollones' post 1965-failure to warn, express
warranty, and intentional tort claims against the tobacco companies.
2 Reversed the district court's decision to:
a. bar the Cipollones' generic risk-utility
claim as a matter of law;
h bar the Cipollones' failure to warn claim
against Liggett;
c grant judgment to the Cipollones' express
warranty claim;
d grant the Cipollones' motion for summary
judgment striking Respondents' affirmative
defenses basedon the statute of
limitations; and
e. deny prejudgment interest.
10 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 111 S. CL 1386 (1991).
71 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. CL 2608, 2614 (1992).
72 Andrew Blum, High Court Lifts Bar To Tobacco Liability Suits, NATL. L.J., July 6, 1992 at 39.
73 Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. 2608 See also Blum, supra note 72, at 39.
74 Ruth Marcus, Smoking Lawsuits Permitted, Tobacco Firms See Little Effect, WASH. POST, June 25, 1992,
at Al.
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Plaintiffs will now enter litigation without the consuming fear of summary
judgment based on the Labeling Act. Indeed, plaintiffs have succeeded in winning
the right to have a jury decide whether their claims are meritorious. Yet, a
significant and troubling questions remain as to the future success of cigarette
litigation. Plaintiffs still face the daunting task of convincing a jury that the they did
not assume the risks associated with smoking. Plaintiffs also face the
overwhelming financial and legal resources at the tobacco companies' disposal-
resources that ultimately claimed victory over the Cipollones.
75
The Pluralities Scope of Preemptive Review
While the Court was mindful of the potential litigation that might arise as a
result of their decision, the Court also understood that its principle task in
Cipollone was to define the preemptive scope of the Labeling Act. Justice Stevens
clearly enumerated that the Court's preemptive review should be limited entirely to
the expressed preemptive language of the respective Labeling Acts. % "Congress'
enactment of a provision defining the preemptive reach of a statute implies that
matters beyond that reach are not preempted. "77
The implication of this line of reasoning is vast, as it would virtually
eliminate implied preemption analysis where Congress has spoken on the issue of
preemption.78 Justice Stevens viewed the Court's role as merely to "identify the
domain expressly preempted", without recourse to occupation of the field or actual
conflict analysis.9 The restriction of federal preemption in this manner is
necessarily rooted in questions of federalism and a balancing of state and federal
power. "In the system of American public law, the basic assumption is that states
have authority to regulate their own citizens and territory. This assumption
justifies an interpretive principle requiring a clear statement (from Congress)
before judges will find federal preemption of state law." 80 This position is more
popularly known as the Plain Meaning Doctrine.
Justice Blackmun, in his opinion concuring in part and dissenting in part,
clearly agreed with Justice Stevens' restrained interpretation. "We resort to
principles of implied preemption - that is, inquiring whether Congress has
occupied a particular field with the intent to supplant state law or whether state law
actually conflicts with federal law ... only when Congress has been silent with
respect to pre-emption." 81 Justice Scalia, on the other hand, felt this interpretation
75 See supra note 8.
76 Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2618.
77 /am
7M Id. at 2633.
79 Id. at 2618.
80 Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REV. 407, 469 (1989).
81 Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2625 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
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far too narrow. "In my view, there is no merit to this newly crafted doctrine of
narrow construction. Under the Supremacy Clause .... our job is to interpret
Congress' decrees of pre-emption neither narrowly nor broadly, but in accordance
with their apparent meaning." 82
Justice Scalia is correct in his assertion that a "narrow construction" or plain
meaning interpretation is not one that has been followed in the past. m  In fact, the
Supreme Court recently rejected such a proposition in Norfolk & Western R. v.
American Train Dispatchers Assn.84  Yet, should the proper method of
preemption construction of statutory provisions be their "ordinary meaning" as
Justice Scalia suggests?
Under an ordinary meaning approach, the Court would be free to interpret
congressional intent as broadly or as narrowly as the statute's text dictated.85 Justice
Scalia's position is interesting in that it would allow the Court considerable
flexibility in their interpretation of congressional intent. Under the ordinary
meaning analysis, the preemption provision of the "comprehensive" Labeling Act
would be afforded a broad interpretation, capable of preempting all state law
claims. Justification for such an expansive reading, Justice Scalia argues, is found
in the expansive language used in the Labeling Acts text.86
Clearly, the "ordinary meaning" approach would vest great power in the
Court to dictate the balance of power between the state and federal governments
through continued use of both implied preemption doctrines. Yet, Justice Scalia
fails to suggest how is this balance would be defined. Would it be based on the
Court's understanding of the "delicate balance" of compromise Congress fashioned
between competing social and economic factions? Or, is it to be based on some
larger understanding of American federalism? Or, perhaps the Court will simply
protect the spoils of the interest group best able to sway Congress. 87
Conversely, the "plain meaning" standard would effectuate a more stringent
standard than would the "ordinary meaning" rule. Justice Scalia's principle fear
regarding the plain meaning doctrine is based on his supposition that such a rule
8 Id. at 2632 (Scalia, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
83 See, e.g., Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 111 S. Ct. 478 (1990); Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller,
486 U.S. 174 (1988); Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987); and Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430
U.S. 519 (1977).
84 111 S. CL 1156 (1991). See also Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 112 S.CL 2031 (1992).
85 See Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1987); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S.
85, 97 (1983).
86 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2632-38 (Scalia, J., concurring in part & dissenting in
7See Paul Wolfson, Preemption and Federalism: The Missing Link, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 69 (1988);
and Marc Z. Edell & Cynthia A. Walters, The Doctrine of Implied Preemption in Products Liability Cases--
Federalism in the Balance, 54 T ENN. L. R. 603 (1987), Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the
Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHi.L. REv. 263 (1982).
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would demand that a "statute that says anything about preemption must say
everything; and it must do so with great exactitude, as any ambiguity concerning
its scope will read in favor of preserving state power."8 Query why Justice Scalia
fears the preservation of state power in light of the fact that Congress can speak
with great clarity when it so desires.
As far back as Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall enumerated that
"the very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to
claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first
duties of government is to afford that protection." Indeed, a well-established
"basic assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state tort law" has
grown out of Marshall's landmark statement. 90 Yet, under Justice Scalia's
interpretation of the Labeling Act, injured parties would have no remedy available
in either the state or federal court.
Justice Blackmun's Deference to Federalism and State Rights
As noted above, Justice Blackmun had no quarrel with Justice Stevens'
enunciation of a "plain meaning" doctrine. Justice Blackmun's disagreement with
Justice Stevens lay in the doctrine's application. Mindful of the presumption
against preemption, Justice Blackmun claimed "any indulgence in construction
should be in favor of the States, because Congress can speak with drastic clarity
whenever it chooses to assure full federal authority, completely displacing the
States."9' Justice Blackmun's position would demand absolute clarity with regard
to congressional intent prior to preempting state authority. In reference to the
Labeling Act, as amended, Justice Blackmun stated, ". . . I find the Court's
conclusion that the 1969 Act preempts at least some common-law damages claims
little short of baffling. [T]he modified language of section 5(b) . . . no more
'clearly' or 'manifestly' exhibits an intent to preempt state common law damages
actions than did the language of its predecessor .... 92_
Justice Blackmun is not alone in his view that the Court often seeks out the
purpose of an act rather than the intention of Congress to displace state regulation.
[T]he courts usually analyze preemption cases in terms of the effect of
the state law on the operation of the federal scheme rather than the intent
of Congress to displace state authority. Courts state that they analyze
88 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. CL 2608, 2634 (1992). (Scalia, J., concurring in part &
dissenting in part).
10 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
9O See, e.g., Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981).
91 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2626 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part &
dissenting in part) (quoting Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767,
780 (1947) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
'2 Id. at 2627.
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congressional intent, but often they consider the general purpose of the
relevant federal statute instead of the specific intent to displace the
states. Congressional 'intent' is analyzed as if the states did not exist,
and the state law is then placed in opposition to that intent. 1
While Justice Blackmun's argument is perhaps the most focused of the three, it
may well be the most utopian as well. Political reality suggests there will be times,
such as in the case of tobacco interests, where preemptive clarity is politically
difficult, if not impossible. Tobacco interests represent millions of dollars in tax
revenues, domestic jobs and foreign exports, thereby bringing the survival of the
tobacco industry well within the national interest. Yet, smoking kills more
Americans annually than all other drgs combined. 94
Where Congress is asked to weigh industry demands for liability insulation
against constituent demands for protection, political reality suggests that Congress
will resort to the nebulous preemptive language contained within the Labeling Act,
allowing the ultimate determination of its intent to be "discovered" in the courts.
The plain meaning doctrine would help to ensure political accountability of both the
legislative and executive branches, as well as maintain the delicate balance of
power between the states and the federal government. Conversely, if the Court is
willing to go where congressional angels fear to tread and actively determine the
extent of congressional preemptive intent, then "Interest groups and politicians
have incentives to engage in activities that make it more difficult for the public to
discover the special interest group nature of legislation."' g
Subsequent Treatment Below
Among the gravest of concerns for both Justices Blackmun and Scalia was
the ability of the lower courts to implement the Court's decision in Cipollone.9 To
date, at least two lower courts have used Cipollone as dispositive of a preemptive
matter.97
In Burke v. Dow Chemical Co., the mother of two children born with brain
damage sought damages following exposure to one of Dow's household
insecticides while pregnant. Suing under state tort law, Dow moved for summary
SWolfson, supra note 87, at 98.
94 See Hearings on the Health Consequences of Smoking: Nicotine Addiction Before the Subcomm. on Health
and the Environment of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, H.R., 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 100-68, at 23
(1988).
95 Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutroy Interpretation: An Interst
Group Model, 86 COLuM. L. REv. 223, 232 (1986).
9 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2637-38 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part &
dissenting in part). "Like Justice Blackmun, 'I can only speculate as to the difficulty lower courts will
encounter in attempting to implement [today's] decision."
g' See Burke v. Dow Chemical Co., 797 F. Supp. 1128 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), and Greenwood Trust Co., v.
Massachusetts, 1971 F.2d 818 (lst Cir. 1992).
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judgment on the grounds that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA) preempted such a claim.9 Quoting extensively from Cipollone, the
District Court for the Eastern District of New York stated, "As the Supreme
Court's most recent tort preemption case indicates, where Congress has provided
an express preemption clause, the presumption against preemption requires courts
to read the clause narrowly." 99 However, the district court went on to examine
court of appeals cases dealing with implied preemption under FIFRA. 100 In the
end, the district court concluded that, "[T]he federalism issues are too important to
warrant foreclosing recovery to an injured party on a questionable theory of
implied preemption." 101
A similar result was reached in Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts. The
issue in Greenwood was whether a federally insured Delaware bank was permitted
to charge its Massachusetts credit card customers a late fee, notwithstanding a
Massachusetts statute expressly prohibiting such a practice. The Commonwealth
attempted to clothe the issue in implied preemptive terms, while the Delaware
banking interests propounded an express preemption analysis. 10 2 Again, the
plurality position prevailed. The first circuit said, "In recent days, the High Court
has made it pellucidly clear that, whenever Congress includes an express
preemption clause in a statute, judges ought to limit themselves to the preemptive
reach of that provision without essaying any further analysis under the various
theories of implied preemption."'10 3
Thus, perhaps Justice Scalia and Justice Blackmun were premature in their
paternalistic worries surounding the ability of the lower courts to impliment the
pluralities' position. Of course, only time will tell whether the lower courts will
truly refrain from resorting to implied preemptive analysis given its long
entrenched history. However, Burke and Greenwood would seem to suggest that
the lower courts have embraced the narrow construction analysis.
CONCLUSION
Although obvious, it is worth remembering that decisions such as Cipollone
do not operate in a vacuum. Congressional reticence at the present time does not
assure continued congressional silence. If "discovery" of congressional intent is
the ultimate objective of preemptive inquiry, Congress may well "clarify" its
position through amendment whenever it wishes; and in fact, such an amendment
9 See 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1992).
99 Burke, 797 F. Supp. at 1137.
100 Id. at 1137-38.
1 0 1 Id. at 1141.
'
102 Greenwood Trust, 971 F.2d at 823.
103BI.
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was proposed in 1991.104 Therefore, while Cipollone is unquestionably critical to
the interpretation of the Labeling Act and a step towards tobacco industry liability,
Cipollone's ultimate precedental value may well rest in its narrowing of preemptive
principles.
CHRISTOPHER J. GAGIN
104 See Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, S. 1088, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. s 2757(b) (1991).
"Nothing in this title, the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act or the Comprehensive Smoking
Education Act of 1984 shall be interpreted to relieve any person from liability at common law or under
state statutory to any other person."
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